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E

E 9370

2

1947

PALESTINE

9 OCT

Registry Number

E9370/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

11th Oct

No.

New York

Dated

2830

Received in Registry

9 Oct

Polish Committee Meetings - Eighth  
Refer New York (11 2810 (E 9329/957/31))  
at eighth meeting on 8 Oct WINIKWICZ (Poland)  
account of... of partitioning... of divide  
it... in political... of... the  
country for their own interests - disregard  
of the welfare of either... as...  
Further comments.

Last Paper.

9354

(Minutes.)

Poland has come right off the fence. Does this mean that the Soviet Union will also support the Jews? If no, the attitude of the U.S.A. will become trickier than ever.

*Stable*  
(Cable)

9/10

References.

(Print.)

61881

Northern Dept. *Open* (15/10/47)

(How disposed of.)

8 *no action* P.U.  
1 *Oct 10*

The satellite and semi-satellite, Poland & Czechoslovakia, are both in favour of partition and to that extent pro-Jew. But I don't think the U.S.A. will commit themselves in this sense

D.S. Reiss  
Oct. 9

(Action completed.)

*G.L.H. 16/10*

(Index.)

*24/10/48*

Next Paper.

E9372

32008 F.O.P.

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Reference: FO 371/61881

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9370

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2830 D. 10.35 p.m. 8th October, 1947  
8th October, 1947. R. 5.00 a.m. 9th October, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem  
Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE  
GIANT

My telegram No. 2810: Palestine Committee.

At eighth meeting on 8th October Winiewicz (Poland) accused His Majesty's Government of pursuing a policy of divide et impera in Palestine and of ruling the country for their own interests in disregard of the welfare of either Arabs or Jews. The Polish Government had the interest of the Arabs at heart, but they could not ignore the rights of the Jewish people as confirmed by many international documents. Winiewicz supported UNSCOP's sixth unanimous recommendation but thought a beginning should be made by the transfer of the 250,000 Jewish displaced persons to Palestine. This would not seriously affect the numerical relationship between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. His preference was for a bi-national state but existing tensions made this impossible at present. He therefore favoured partition on the basis of the majority plan hoping that the economic union for which that plan provided would lead in time to closer cooperation.

2. Fawzi Bey (Egypt) drew attention to the inaction of the United Nations on the two questions of protection for minorities and resettlement of displaced persons. In the latter operation all countries should take a share.

3. Masaryk reiterated the view already expressed by the Czech Delegation that the Colonial Secretary's statement had greatly increased the responsibility of the United Nations. He expressed support in principle for majority plan.

4. Gonzalez (Colombia) reserved his position on the two UNSCOP plans and spoke only of the eleven unanimous recommendations. He proposed an immediate recommendation to the Assembly to act on Number 11 and the appointment of a sub-committee to consider means of giving effect to number 6.

5. Castro (El Salvador) proposed resolution calling upon the Jewish agency and the Arab Higher Committee to appoint three representatives each to meet in conference and to report to the present session of the Assembly on the results of their meeting.

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E

E 9372

9 OCT

~~1947~~

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9372/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

111 Eran Beirut

Dated

120

Received in Registry

8 Oct 9

Arabs League Council Meeting.

After (E9219/957/31) some of Arab leaders are becoming alarmed at prospect of British withdrawal from Palestine. High up Arab officials stated that according to reports receipts already sent for fleeing Palestine and immigrant and for occupying country by force as soon as British evacuation started. They asked if British proposed to cause the Arabs to clear Palestine.

Last Paper.

9370.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 Matheson  
1  
✓ Oct. 10

(Minutes.)

The Arabs would obviously like us to remove all Jews from Palestine before withdrawing. I see no reason why we should endeavour to reassure them about the ~~new~~ possible results of a policy of whose sincerity they openly ~~scuff~~. In any case, it is hard to see how we could reassure them.

*Stable*  
(C.F. & CABLE)

on the lines of para. 2 last sentence 9/10

We can't do anything at present. But when we go we shall want to leave somebody in charge and we hope it will be an Arab-Jewish administration. I think that should be our line.

D.S. Beins  
Oct. 9

(Action completed.)

G.E. 6/10

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
21/10/48

Next Paper.

E 9374

The question of how we withdraw will need very careful consideration in due course, but for me ~~the Council~~ in any case cannot ourselves to consulting the

32008 F.O.P.

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the Arab Gants. Besides, for the present it is, I  
think, desirable to leave them guessing, to help  
them to <sup>realise</sup> the seriousness of the situation.

P. J. Curran  
10/x

Pf. see Sir O. Sargent's minute  
on the copy of the let. within.

I have referred to this point  
in a draft paper on various  
aspects of withdrawal, now  
submitted.

W. J. B.  
10-x

b

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240

E

11  
E 9382  
9 OCT

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9382/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

W. Nurdas

Dated

Namadell

Received in Registry

436  
7 Oct  
9 ~

Effect on Arabs of withdrawal from Palestine.  
Conversation with Syrian President, who appeared convinced that no solution acceptable to Arabs would be reached by U.N. and asked whether British Army would go where it would go and whether it would leave Arab or Jewish part first. He urged that personal and confidential discussions should take place immediately between heads of each Arab State and accredited British representatives to discuss withdrawal and should take place.

Last Paper.

9374

References.

(Minutes.)

The Arabs are now beginning to take our statement seriously. *Stube*  
9/10

And they are beginning to get frightened. We cannot, of course, discuss with the Arabs the plan of <sup>our</sup> withdrawal from Palestine.

*R.G.*  
-arran  
✓ "x"

*WAS 3*

16. x

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, *Wadhwa* & O.  
✓ Oct 10

(Action completed.)

*L. 11/10*

(Index)

*11/10*

Next Paper.

E 9401

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61881

12 E

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Dundas  
No. 436

D. 7:44a.m. 8th October, 1947.

7th October, 1947.  
Repeated to Bagdad

R. 9.20a.m. 8th October, 1947.

Cairo  
Jerusalem  
Jedda  
Cairo B.M.E.O.  
Beirut Saving  
Amman Saving

E 9382  
9 OCT

LIGHT

Syrian President sent for me to-day and immediately began to orate about Palestine. I took the opportunity of speaking as instructed in your telegram No. 514.

2. He appeared to be convinced that no solution acceptable to the Arabs would be reached by the United Nations and asked whether the British Army were to go, where it would go and whether it would leave Arab or Jewish parts first.

3. Without giving opportunity to answer these questions he went on to urge that personal and confidential discussions should take place immediately between heads of each Arab state and accredited British representatives as to how British withdrawal should be carried out. He particularly stressed that any such discussions should be secret and that fire-brands such as Saleh Jaber should be given no opportunity to take part. The British Army, he said, had been in Palestine for thirty years and if it left overnight Arab countries would have to help their brothers in Palestine against Jews since Arabs were unarmed and had no money.

4. I emphasised the desirability of an agreed solution being reached and of Arab states in any case abiding by United Nations decisions, but I fear that I made no impression. He would discuss only what could be done to ensure that evacuation of British troops from Palestine would not lead to massacre or bloodshed "as in India". I had no doubt he personally at least is convinced that we are in earnest and fears results of British withdrawal.

5. I undertook to put this proposal before you.

Jerusalem please pass to Amman as my telegram No. 80 and Cairo to Middle East Minister as my telegram No. 65.

OCT 1947  
MIDDLE EAST  
MINISTER  
AMMAN

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FO 371 / 61881

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13  
E 9403

1947

PALESTINE

10 OCT

Registry Number

E 9403/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

M. K. Mans  
Beirut

Dated

122

Received in Registry

8 Oct  
10 -

Colonial Secretary Statement, Arab Reaction

Refer FO 371 619 (E 9219/951/31)

Spoke to Yusuf Fakhri an authorized Arab strongly denied any suggestion that responsible Arabs were treating colonial Secretary's statement lightly. At meeting between Fakhri, Fawzi and Salah Fakhri and Fawzi Mardam, it became apparent that Arabs were still thinking in terms of economic boycott.

Last Paper.

9401

(Minutes.)

Hable  
(T.S. CABLE)

10/10

D. S. Beins  
Oct. 10

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

B. Mathieson  
80  
Oct

Salah Fakhri's behaviour is really becoming very odd. It is a disturbing sign.

P. G. Farran  
10/10

BAGB  
13-X

(Action completed.)

G. E. L. 10/10

(Index.)

12/1/48

Next Paper.

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1947

E

PALESTINE

E 9404

Registry Number E 9404/957/31  
 FROM W.O.L. Matheson  
 No. 60  
 Dated 75872/158  
 Received in Registry 8 Oct  
 10 -

Implications of Majority Plan  
 In receipt of UNSCOP report, began study of majority plan in case 4/1/47 were called upon to take part in their implementation and immediately met various snags as proposed to apply International Trusteeship system to City of Jerusalem. Enclosed draft despatch recently drawn on same to 14/10 asks for C.O. comments

Last Paper

9403

References

9995/951/31

(Print)

(How disposed of)

W.O.L. Matheson  
 60  
 16

(Action completed)

J.E.M. 1/10

(Index)

[Handwritten initials]

Next Paper

9405

(Minutes.)

the C.O. admit that this is somewhat of an academic exercise: but they think we ought to work it out. U.N. (Int.) Dept.

Do you concur?

J.R.S. Baird  
 Oct. 10

I agree that the problem is at present academic, but it may be well to be prepared, and the C.O. draft despatch can do no harm in exploring the possibilities.

As regards the Trusteeship aspect, I agree with the C.O. views. The most important snag is that mentioned in para. 4 of the despatch.

The suggested Statute for the city will be a tricky business. I do not know whether it is contemplated to isolate the city as a kind of Vatican, but leave its economic relations with Palestine undisturbed, or include a hinterland on the Trieste model. The former seems the obvious choice, as the only object is to preserve it as a religious shrine.

The question of control & responsibility for the city

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would have to be gone into carefully in due course. The "integrity & independence" of Trieste, for example is supposed to be assured by the Security Council. We should have to consider the desirability of this applying to Jerusalem if it were set up on the Trieste model.

As a first step, I would approve of the C.O. dft., but this Dept. would like to see further developments & have a chance to comment.

Colinvaughan  
- 19/10.

I have so informed Mr Mathison C.O. in the attached draft.

JB Oct. 14

G.P.P. 80. Forward Mr Ross Williams dispatch no 28 to H/C Palestine dated 24/10

JB Oct. 22

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Reference:

**FO** 371 / 61881



DRAFT DESPATCH

FOR FOREIGN OFFICE CONCURRENCE

HIGH COMMISSIONER, TOP SECRET

PALESTINE.

I have the honour to refer to your Top Secret and Personal telegram No.1691 of the 8th September 1947 in paragraph 6 of which it was suggested that the drafting of a trusteeship agreement for the City of Jerusalem as recommended in the majority recommendation of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, should begin forthwith.

2. I have considered the majority recommendations regarding the City of Jerusalem in part 3 of Chapter VI of the report, in particular the statement that "the International Trusteeship System is the most suitable method for meeting this special problem, for the reason that the Trusteeship Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations, affords a convenient and effective means of ensuring both the desired international supervision and the well-being of the population".

I have however the gravest doubts whether the International Trusteeship System, as defined in the United Nations Charter and as interpreted by H.M.G. both in the United Nations and in the trust territories for which H.M.G. is already the Administering Authority, is the proper instrument to implement the recommendations relating to the City of Jerusalem.

3. In the first place, the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System, as laid down in Chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations, include the progressive development towards self-government or independence of the peoples concerned in/

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5. Further difficulty involved in applying the Trusteeship System to this case would arise from the fact that, in accordance with Article 79 of the Charter, any terms of trusteeship require to be agreed upon by the "States directly concerned". Although no agreed definition of this phrase exists, the Arab States members of the United Nations could certainly use this provision to delay or postpone approval by the Assembly of any Trusteeship Agreement which did not commend itself to those States.

6. I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that a Trusteeship Agreement is not a suitable instrument for the solution of the problem of providing an international regime for the City of Jerusalem. On the assumption that some form of international regime is to be established, therefore, some alternative method must be found of giving effect to this decision. Should the majority recommendation be approved by the General Assembly a special sub-committee (on which H.M.G. would no doubt obtain a seat) will presumably be charged with working out a detailed plan for the City. Such a sub-committee could hardly be expected to function properly without the advice and unique experience of the Mandatory Power. If such a body were set up, H.M.G.'s representative on it would have to be instructed to oppose any proposal of a Trusteeship Agreement for the reasons given above, and urge instead that some form of Statute should be framed for the City which could be endorsed by resolution of the General Assembly. It would seem most advisable from the point of view of practical administration that such a Statute should be drawn up in wide terms

allowing/

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allowing the maximum flexibility on all but the essentials, in order that the actual City government might be developed and amended locally in the light of circumstances without undue argument and delay. Useful precedents might be found in the International Zone of Tangier and the Free City of Trieste. The representative of H.M.G. might have available, for submission at a suitable stage, a draft prepared along these lines; though the formal wording and promulgation of the Statute, if accepted in principle, would of course have to be an international responsibility.

7. Another point that would have to be considered is the legal status of the inhabitants of the City under such a Statute. The majority plan would permit them to adopt the citizenship of either State. It would however appear desirable that some form of "international status", on the analogy of that conferred upon the holders of Nansen Passports, should also be conferred upon them, with a provision for dual nationality enabling those who so wished to enjoy, in addition to their 'international status', a citizenship of either the Jewish or the Arab State.

8. I submit the foregoing suggestions for your consideration and would be grateful to know your views particularly as to the lines along which the Statute for the City might be drafted.

I have, etc.,

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Registry  
No.

E9404/951/31

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. 15h. 22

OUT FILE

Dear Mathieson, 16 October 1947

Thank you for your letter of October

8th on the subject of the difficulties  
inherent in applying the International  
Trusteeship system to the City of Jerusalem.

I have shown your letter to our United

W.A.C. Mathieson Esq, Nations Department, who agree with you  
Colonial Office.

that, while the problem is at present  
academic, it will be well to ~~be prepared.~~ *look into it.*

They agree with your draft and ask to be  
~~informed of~~ *informed of*  
~~shown~~ any further developments.

Doct. 14

Yours sincerely

(Sgd.) John Beith

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*Draft.*  
Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.  
JGSB

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**FO**  
371 / 61881

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OUT FILE 23

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

16th October, 1947.

(E 9404/951/31)

Thank you for your letter of October 8th on the subject of the difficulties inherent in applying the International Trusteeship system to the City of Jerusalem.

I have shown your letter to our United Nations Department, who agree with you that, while the problem is at present academic, it will be well to look into it. They agree with your draft and ask to be informed of any further developments.

*(Signature)*

*(Sgd.) John Beith*

(J.G.S. Beith)

W.A.C. Mathieson, Esq.,  
Colonial Office.

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proposed regime. The Trusteeship Council is not in permanent session but meets only twice a year, for approximately one month, in June and November. It has no executive powers but operates by permissive authority to receive annual reports from the Administering Authorities; accept petitions concerning the trust territories; and make periodic visits to those territories. I am most anxious that these permissive powers should not be extended so as to give the Council executive supervision over any trust territory, which would be clearly necessary if the effective government of the City of Jerusalem were to be carried out in the way the majority report intends. Any grant of executive powers, however limited, in this particular case might well prove a most embarrassing precedent for intervention by the Council in other non-self-governing territories at some future date.

5. Further difficulty involved in applying the Trusteeship system to this case would arise from the fact that, in accordance with Article 79 of the Charter, any terms of trusteeship require to be agreed upon by the "States directly concerned". Although no agreed definition of this phrase exists, the Arab States members of the United Nations could certainly use this provision to delay or postpone approval by the Assembly of any Trusteeship Agreement which did not commend itself to those States.

6. I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that a Trusteeship Agreement is not a suitable instrument for the solution of the problem of providing an international regime for the City of Jerusalem. On the assumption that some form of international regime is to be established, therefore, some alternative method must be found of giving effect to this decision. Should the majority recommendation be approved by the General Assembly a special sub-committee (on which His Majesty's Government would no doubt obtain a seat) will presumably be charged with working out a detailed plan for the City. Such a sub-committee could hardly be expected to function properly without the advice and unique experience of the Mandatory Power. If such a body were set up, His Majesty's Government's representative on it would have to be instructed to oppose any proposal of a Trusteeship Agreement for the reasons given above, and urge instead that some form of Statute should be framed for the City which could be endorsed by resolution of the General Assembly. It would seem most advisable from the point of view of practical administration that such a Statute should be drawn up in wide terms allowing the maximum flexibility on all but the essentials, in order that the actual City government might be developed and amended locally in the light of circumstances without undue argument and delay. Useful precedents might be found in the International Zone of Tangier and the Free City of Trieste. The representative of His Majesty's Government might have available, for submission at a suitable stage, a draft prepared along these lines; though the formal wording and promulgation of the Statute, if accepted in principle, would of course have to be an international responsibility.

7. Another point that would have to be considered is the legal status of the inhabitants of the City under such a Statute. The majority plan would permit them to adopt the citizenship of either State. It would however appear desirable that some form of "international status", on the analogy of that conferred upon the holders of Nansen Passports, should also be conferred upon them, with a provision for dual nationality

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Reference:-

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enabling those who so wished to enjoy, in addition to their 'international status', a citizenship of either the Jewish or the Arab State.

8. I submit the foregoing suggestions for your consideration and would be grateful to know your views particularly as to the lines along which the Statute for the City might be drafted.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient,  
humble servant,

(Sgd) J. Rees Williams

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**FO** 371 / 61881

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E 9405

28

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9405/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

U.K. Del

Dated

New York

Received in Registry

28/11/48

9 Oct

10

Resolution Committee meetings, death.  
Refer New York tel 2830/169370/92/31  
Cecil (London) spend discussion of  
minut. meeting, the liberal side. Solved decision  
by 11/11/48. In conformity with the  
opinions of the British people, it is regretted  
that a Jewish State would be  
dangerous to the Arab people although it  
will not make

Last Paper.

9404

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Hatheran  
10  
Oct 10

(Action completed.)

FS 10/10

(Index.)

2/16/48

Next Paper.

E 9413

(Minutes.)

The Committee has become a  
race in which ~~the~~ the two  
jockeys <sup>the favourites, U.S. & USSR,</sup> have orders not to  
make the running.

I take it that when the  
"general debate" closes the  
Committee will proceed to a  
detailed examination of the  
UNSCOP plans.

UN (Doc.) <sup>11/15/48</sup> Sept. <sup>12.5.48</sup> Reins  
Oct. 10

RG  
11/18

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PALESTINE

Registry Number E 9413/971/31  
TELEGRAM FROM  
No. 111/1005  
Dated Beirut  
Received 418  
in Registry 8 Oct  
10 -

Arab League Council Meeting, Beirut.  
Twelfth ordinary meeting of Arab League Council  
opened in Beirut Oct 7. Speeches by Fawzi  
Yassin, Abd Bey Sabl, and Azzam Pasha.  
Paper gist of speeches. It is to be  
concluded will be rolled upon it discuss  
two important questions, Palestine and Egypt.

Last Paper.

91105

(Minutes.)

*Sabl*  
(J.E.CABE)  
10/10

References.

*Egyptian Express 20/10*

*Azzam Pasha does not come well out  
of this!*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, *Matheson*  
60  
✓ Oct 13

*P. Jarrum*  
✓ 11/x  
*BAE*  
16 x

(Action completed.)

*934  
76 10/21/10*

(Index.)

*[Signature]*  
21/10/47

Next Paper.

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GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

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E 9413

Mr. Evans, D: 3.58 p.m. 8th October, 1947.  
No. 718  
8th October, 1947. R: 10.50 p.m. 8th October, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo,  
British Middle East Office Cairo,  
Bagdad,  
Damascus,  
Amman,  
Jedda,  
Jerusalem,  
United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Arab League.

The seventh ordinary session of the Arab League Council opened in Beirut on October 7th. Inaugural meeting was held in public and, after reading of a message from the President of the Republic, speeches were delivered by Yussef Yassin (Chairman of last session), Riad Bey Solh (who will preside during the present session) and Azzam Pasha.

2. Following is gist of speeches. The Council will be called upon to discuss two important questions, Palestine and Egypt. All speeches emphasised extreme criticism of the stage which had been reached in the Palestine question. Yussef expressed the hope that the Egyptian case would soon be settled and that the desire of Egypt and her valley would be fulfilled. Riad Bey Solh said Arabs were determined not to surrender their rights nor to accept partition or invasion of their territory and recalled that the Political Committee had declared that Arab countries would assist the Palestine Arabs with men, money and arms. As regards Egypt she continues, he said, to demand her rights and will achieve her objective viz the strengthening of her independence and the unity of her valley; the sentiments of sister Arab States would be of great assistance to her. Azzam Pasha stated the Arab League was faced with two fundamental forces which impeded its freedom of progress, European colonization and Zionism. The former [grp. undec. ? in time] will have disappeared but Zionism relying on strong religious and communal sentiments had directed its hopes towards Palestine. The Arabs had pledged themselves to preserve the Arabic character of Palestine for ever and would sacrifice their wealth and lives in that course. Arabs hoped the Jews of the world would realise the state of hysteria in which their leaders and organisations lived would lead to a violent struggle between them and the Arabs.

/3.



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3. There was no mention of the Colonial Secretary's statement in the speeches, speaking to journalists before the meeting Azzam Pasha however stated that British mandate over Palestine had become a corpse which should be thrown out.

4. Council will meet in secret session this evening.

Cairo please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No.166 and Foreign Office to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No.22.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York by Foreign Office.]

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61881

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E 9422

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9422/957/31.

FROM

I.R. G. Lavelle

No.

to Mr. Bevin.

Dated

14. Oct

Received in Registry

11

Palentine Situation.

agrees with U.M.G. Policy regarding Palestine, gives further views says that U.M.G. will not become a party towards implementing any decision by U.N. which is not acceptable to Jews and Arabs.

Last Paper

9413

(Minutes.)

I do not think any reply is needed.

*J. Bevin*  
(TELETYPE)  
13/10

References

Private Sec.

I think a letter of acknowledgement and thanks to this friendly letter has gone?

D. J. Bevin  
Oct. 13

(Print)

(How disposed of)

A P. Sec. etc. check has been sent, which I presume is sufficient; if not, please let me know.  
P. Kinross  
14/10.

(Action completed)

*G. E. M. 16/10*

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
24/10/48

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9424

There is no further action is required

*R. G.*  
16/10

D. J. Bevin  
Oct. 16

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Reference:

FO 371/61881

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7 OCT 1947  
C. J. ...  
2. ...  
P.K.  
7/10

Encl 35

63, Royal Hospital Road,  
Chelsea, S.W. 3.

Flaxman 1839.

E 9 22  
4th October 1947.

Dear Mr. Bevin,

As an ex-High Commissioner of Palestine, I venture to congratulate you upon the admirable statement of the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Palestine, which was made to the United Nations Committee by Mr. Creech Jones on the 26th of September. No previous Government has made such a clear and explicit announcement of its policy and intentions.

I trust that His Majesty's Government will be able successfully to resist the pressure that will certainly be brought to bear upon them from all quarters to induce them to continue to undertake the thankless task of keeping order in Palestine.

Although His Majesty's Government have stated that "if the Assembly should recommend a policy which is not acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs, the United Kingdom Government would not feel able to implement it. Then it would be necessary to provide some alternative authority to implement it," I was concerned to read in the leading article in the "Times" of the 27th of September the following passage, "Whether Britain will join with other powers in enforcing a settlement of this nature (i.e. one which is not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews) must depend first upon the British view of its inherent justice, and secondly upon the British estimate of the extent to which force would require to be employed.....If support can be secured from men of good will and moderation on either side, the resistance of more fanatical and intransigent elements, however bitter and even dangerous, might not sway this country's decision."

Having regard to the present state of Palestine, who can measure in advance the extent to which force would have to be employed to impose upon the Arabs and the Jews a decision that is repugnant to both parties?

I earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government will not be enticed into taking a share in enforcing such a decision by the illusory hope that there are in Palestine men of good

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will and moderation on either side who could overcome the resistance of the more fanatical and intransigent elements.

The experience of recent years in Palestine shows that men of good will and moderation are powerless against the terrorists and extremists.

Yours sincerely,

*J. R. Chancellor*

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37

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E 9424

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E9424/957/31

FROM

Ex officio

No.

Beirut

Dated

80/28/47

Received in Registry

30 Sept  
11 Oct

Letter to UNSCOP by Mr. Moubarak.  
Refer Beirut CI 692 (E9030/957/31) encloses newspaper extract giving text of M. Moubarak's letter and further extract giving an account of a meeting of Chamber of Deputies on Sept 29, which was devoted to discussion of M. Moubarak's letter.

Last Paper

9423

(Minutes.)

*[Signature]* 13/10

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

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(Index)

*[Signature]*

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Ces deux pays, ces deux foyers prouvent jusqu'aujourd'hui l'utilité et la nécessité de leur existence comme entité séparée et indépendante.

Le Liban d'abord a toujours été et demeure le refuge de tous les persécutés chrétiens du Moyen-Orient. C'est là que les Arméniens, persécutés en Turquie, ont trouvé refuge. C'est là que les Chaldéens d'Iraq, pourchassés de leur pays, ont trouvé asile. C'est là que se réfugièrent les Polonais, traqués de l'Europe en feu.

C'est là que les Français, refoulés de Syrie, s'y sont trouvés en sécurité.

C'est là que les familles anglaises de Palestine, fuyant le terrorisme, ont reçu le gîte et l'abri.

Le Liban comme la Palestine devront demeurer les foyers permanents des minoritaires.

Quel a été le rôle des Juifs en Palestine?

Etudiée sous cet angle, la Palestine de 1918, nous apparaît comme un pays aride, pauvre, dénué de toute ressource et le moins évolué de tous les vilayets turcs voisins.

La Colonie musulmane qui y habite frise la misère. L'immigration juive commence, des colonies se forment et s'établissent. En moins de vingt ans, le pays est transformé; c'est la prospérité dans les cultures, l'installation des grandes industries; c'est la richesse qui s'installe dans ce pays. La présence à côté du Liban, d'un peuple si évolué et travailleur ne peut que contribuer au bien-être de tous.

Le Juif est réalisateur, le Libanais est très enclin à l'adaptation, c'est pourquoi ce voisinage ne pourra que servir à l'amélioration de toutes les conditions d'existence des habitants.

Au point de vue culturel, ces deux peuples peuvent se vanter de posséder, à eux seuls, autant d'intellectuels que tous les pays réunis du Proche Orient. Il n'est pas juste que la loi soit imposée par une majorité ignorante qui veut imposer sa volonté.

Il ne serait pas juste qu'un million d'humains, évolués et instruits, soient le jouet de quelques personnes intéressées se trouvant à la tête ou menant quelques millions d'individus arriérés ou peu progressifs et faisant la loi comme ils le désirent. Il existe un ordre dans le monde. C'est toujours cet ordre qui l'équilibre. Si les Nations Unies ont à cœur de le maintenir, elles devront mettre tout en œuvre pour le consolider.

Des raisons majeures, sociales, humaines et religieuses exigent qu'il soit créé dans ces deux pays, deux foyers, pour les minorités: Un Foyer chrétien au Liban, comme il l'a toujours été; un Foyer juif en Palestine.

Ces deux centres qui se relient géographiquement l'un à l'autre, s'appuyant et s'entr'aidant économiquement, formeront le pont indispensable entre l'Occident et l'Orient tant au point de vue culturel, qu'au point de vue civilisateur.

Le voisinage de ces deux peuples contribuera à maintenir la paix dans ce Proche Orient si divisé par les rivalités et réduira les

/persécutions ...

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3.

persécutions des minorités qui trouveront toujours un asile dans l'un de ces deux pays.

Voilà l'opinion des Libanais que je représente, voilà l'opinion de ce peuple que votre Commission d'Enquete n'a pu entendre.

Derrière les volets clos de l'Hotel de Sofar, vous n'avez pu écouter que les paroles dictées à nos représentants, soi-disant légaux, par leurs maitres et seigneurs des pays arabes musulmans voisins. La véritable voix libanaise a été étouffée par la horde des faussaires des élections du 25 Mai.

Le Liban réclame la Liberté pour les Juifs de Palestine, comme il souhaite sa propre liberté et son indépendance.

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Extract from Le Jour of 30th September, 1947

CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES

LES DEPUTES MARONITES CONDAMNENT L'ATTITUDE DE Mgr. MOBARAK

Motion de confiance en faveur du Gouvernement

Le mémoire adressé par S.E. Mgr. Ignace Mobarak, archevêque maronite de Beyrouth à l'U.N.S.C.O.P. lors de son séjour au Liban a été évoqué hier à la Chambre. L'Assemblée lui a consacré la totalité des débats.

Prenant la parole au nom des députés maronites, le Dr. Raif Bellama annonce que ces derniers avaient tenu une réunion dans la journée et approuvé à la unanimité un texte dans lequel ils condamnent l'attitude de l'Archevêque maronite de Beyrouth. Le Dr. Raif Bellama critique sévèrement la volteface de Mgr. Mobarak qui avait fortement contribué à la consolidation du régime d'indépendance et obtenu pour son activité "la Médaille de l'Indépendance". Il réaffirme l'indéfectible attachement des Libanais de tous rites à l'intégrité du Liban dans ses frontières et dans le cadre des stipulations de la Charte de la Ligue arabe. "Au même titre que leurs autres compatriotes, a-t-il ajouté, les Maronites ont à cœur la cause palestinienne. Les députés libanais qui défendent actuellement cette cause à travers le monde, notamment MM Camille Chamoun, Hamid Franglé Victor Khoury, Cheikh Sami El-Khoury, et bien d'autres, appartiennent en effet à la communauté maronite".

Succédant à la tribune au Dr. Bellama, M. Wadih Naim donne lecture de la lettre des députés maronites. Celle-ci comporte les trois points suivants:

- (1) La communauté maronite désavoue entièrement le mémoire de Mgr. Mobarak ainsi que ses précédents manifestes.
- (2) Mgr. Mobarak n'a aucune qualité pour engager la responsabilité de sa communauté.
- (3) Le Président de la République, la Chambre et le Gouvernement ont interprété fidèlement le sentiment du pays en définissant sa position dans la question palestinienne.

La lettre ajoute que le Liban appartient à toutes les communautés qui sont plus que jamais solidement unies et fermement attachées à la souveraineté l'intégrité et l'indépendance de leur patrie.

Deux députés n'ont pas signé la lettre en question: M. Amine Makhlé, que ses collègues n'avaient pas pu atteindre et M. Joseph Karam qui est contre le principe de la politique des manifestes mais qui, en la présente circonstance, se rallie sans réserves à la démarche de ses collègues maronites.

D'autres députés maronites, M. Ibrahim Azar, Georges Zouein, Cheikh Farid El-Khazen, Khalil Abi-Jaoudé et Joseph Karam, interviennent successivement au cours des débats pour s'élever avec énergie contre la malheureuse initiative de Mgr. Mobarak. Ils mettent en relief la volonté des Libanais, appartenant à toutes les communautés de vivre dans l'union et la concorde.

M. Ibrahim Azar souligne l'appui que la cause arabe trouve auprès du Saint-Siège et le désaveu infligé dernièrement par S.B. Mgr. Arida à S.E. Mgr. Ignace Mobarak pour son opposition à l'égard du Gouvernement.

D'autres députés non maronites, notamment M. Kamal Djomblatt

/ M. Nassar

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1947

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E 9425

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9425/957/31

FROM

Chancery

No.

Washington

Dated

15/3/6/47

Received in Registry

Oct 4

- 11

Colonial Secretary Statement, U.S. comment.  
U.S. comment on Colonial Secretary statement  
may be summarized by saying that  
division of I.M.G. is generally welcomed.  
Four various press accounts.

Last paper

9424

References

cc 10  
N.A. Dept.

(Minutes.)  
copy to c.o. (Mr. Mulholland)

*[Signature]*  
ET. E. CABLE

A bit out of date, but interesting 13/10

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*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*  
14/x

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Bort. 21

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8.80  
N.A. Dept.  
Oct 16

(Action completed)

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22/10

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
24/8/48

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The problem of Palestine must be met, not abandoned. This is also a challenge to American leadership, which has been too cautious about the partition issue. Settlement involves duties, however difficult or disagreeable, which neither Britain nor America, nor any other nation in the United Nations, should shirk.

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No. 750

(403/104/47)

54  
E 9026

HIS Majesty's *Chargé d'Affaires* at Moscow  
presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State  
and has the honour to transmit to him <sup>for Foreign Affairs</sup> the under-mentioned documents.

*British* EMBASSY

MOSCOW

7th October, 1934.

*Reference to previous correspondence :*

Moscow telegram to Foreign Office No. 2217. *9304/104/a*

*Description of Enclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
"Pravda" - 6th October, 1947.	"Bankrupts" by D. Zaslavski.

Copies sent under P/L to :

UKDEL NEW YORK No. 14.  
JERUSALEM U/n  
WASHINGTON No. 148.



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FO 371 / 61881

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PART I

6th October, 1947

TRAVDA                      BANKRUPTS      By D. Zaslavski

Bankruptcy is an extremely common and wide spread phenomenon in the capitalist world. According to the general rule, the capitalist boss, manufacturer or banker, long conceals his poor state of financial affairs. The moment inevitably arrives, however, when it cannot be concealed. If the capitalist does not dispense a bullet into his head, he announces his insolvency. The Court decides the question of whether to consider his bankruptcy usual or fraudulent. A fraudulent bankruptcy involves a prison sentence. An unfraudulent one involves the loss of trust, credit in the Stock Exchange and in the banks.

This is the way the matter takes place in the private-ownership economic world. Sometimes the bankruptcy may be a misfortune - it always involves shame and loss of one's "good name".

Political bankruptcy in the capitalist world has quite a different appearance.

The British Government has announced its political incapacity in the Palestine question for all to hear. 30 years of domination in Palestine has led to complete collapse and final bankruptcy. Britain cannot and does not wish to pay the promissory notes given by the British Government to the League of Nations in 1920. It has been compelled to renounce the mandate and is proposing that the United Nations should disentangle the mess of political intrigue and human blood, which is the result of the many years of British administration in Palestine.

The United Nations Organisation is essentially called upon to become a sort of court in the case of insolvent debtors. Political and economic bankruptcy is in evidence. But in this case are we dealing with a "conscientious" or a fraudulent political bankruptcy? Were one to judge from the external appearance of the bankrupt, his face not only does not mirror signs of shame and disgrace, but on the contrary a certain sense of offence is registered: we, you see, were so concerned about the peoples of Palestine, and they have brought us, poor things, to political bankruptcy! And will not certain sympathetic states pity the manoeuvre of the Fonvizin Mitrofanushka Prostakov - Britain: Oh, how the British Mama has worn herself out oppressing the Arabs and Jews!

We shall soon see just how the bankrupt politicians will place the blame on innocent heads. Meanwhile, let us dwell on the fact that the British Empire, which only recently was an extremely powerful state which had assembled under the power of several tens of millions of people, hundreds of millions of colonial slaves, has publicly and officially admitted its insolvency in the nationality question. Let us leave aside the sincerity of this confession. British troops have not yet been withdrawn from Palestine and it is not known whether they will be withdrawn. Having abandoned the position of supreme master, the British Government may yet agree to accept the role of a gendarme controlled by America in Palestine.

It is important for all those who are interested in the problems of nationality policy that Britain should have proclaimed her political bankruptcy in that policy. This is another tremendous collapse of the bourgeois nationality policy which is clearly confirming the correctness and profundity of the Lenin-Stalin theory of the nationality question. Life is incontrovertibly confirming the scientific prediction. Yes, the nationality problem is insoluble on the lines of an imperialistic-colonial policy. The bourgeoisie can merely confuse this issue, turning it into a bloody mass of contradictions. Only the working class can solve the nationality problem, in those ways & by those means which have resulted in the friendship of peoples in the Soviet Union - by the complete liquidation of national and racial oppression, by the recognition not only on paper but in actuality of the complete equality of peoples, by the recognition of the right of every people to decide its own fate, either by separation as a state and the formation of an independent state, or by voluntary federative agreement with another people, another state.

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PART I

6th October, 1947

TRAVDA (cont'd)

Apparently feeling the shakiness of his arguments, Johnson hastened to seize on to the proposal of Spaak. He declared this proposal was acceptable to the American delegation. He at the same time proposed to hear the opinion of representatives of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania regarding this proposal. Johnson said: "The American delegation agrees to rectify its draft resolution in the direction indicated by the French delegation if the replies of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria are satisfactory".

The Delegate from Colombia on cooperation among the Great Powers

The Colombian delegate, Lopez, recalled that when Churchill ordered British troops in Greece to renounce their neutrality and fire upon the people this had caused great discontent all over the world. Roosevelt had disapproved of that decision. The Colombian delegate went on to indicate that power politics have been used in Greece for a long time by certain powers. Greece had for many years been in the sphere of British influence. Said Lopez "It later became known that the USA was intending to take Britain's place in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea."

Having submitted a just illumination of the history of the Greek question the Colombian delegate did not, however, find it possible to draw the logical conclusions. "Can the recognition of the guilt of one country or another facilitate the solution of the question" he asked. The Colombian delegate proposed "To give an opportunity to the Governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece, to make declarations of their good intentions".

Lopez stressed the need to consolidate cooperation among the great powers which is the basis of the UN. He indicated that a solution of the Greek question depended first of all on the achievement of mutual understanding among the great powers. He proposed "to ask the great powers directly interested in a solution of the Greek issue to discuss this question among themselves before the ending of the general debates, in an effort to determine the possibility of working out a general approach to its solution".

(3 columns) (Full translation) TRAVDA 6.10.47

TRAVDA

ARRIVAL IN ISTANBUL OF NEW AMERICAN MISSION

ANKARA 5th October TASS The paper "Cumhuriyet" reports that an American Mission made up of 7 members of the Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives has arrived at Istanbul and will discuss problems of civil aviation and airfields. The paper points out that 12 million lire will be spent to expand an airfield in Eshilkei.

(10 lines) TRAVDA 6.10.47

TRAVDA

THE WAR IN INDONESIA

THE HAGUE 5th October TASS Today's communiques from Indonesia tell of continued Dutch offensive operations against the Indonesians on many sectors of the front in Java and Sumatra.

(10 lines) TRAVDA 6.10.47

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PART I

Section A

6th October, 1947

PRAVDA (cont'd)

The British ruling classes are attempting to justify their bankruptcy by the intractability of the Arabs and Jews, and their inability to get along with each other. It is <sup>they</sup> if you please, and not the British imperialists who are responsible for the fact that a small and hitherto peaceful segment of the world has become a hornets' nest. Perhaps somewhere in the American backwoods where it is not known what is meant by the modern nationality question, these lamentations may be successful. We in the Soviet land are too well acquainted with them, because of the not too-distant past.

30 years ago when British troops took Palestine by force and absorbed her, it appeared, forever, - in bourgeois Russia, Tsarist and Kerenski, bourgeois politicians were giving assurance that you could not leave Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanians face to face for a moment since they would inevitably cut each other's throats and there would be national pogroms. They said the same thing about all other neighbouring peoples in Tsarist Russia.

30 years have passed. In Palestine British Governments following one upon another, Conservative, Liberal, Labour - have followed one and the same traditional colonial-nationality policy. In the Soviet Union, one and the same unified Bolshevik Government applied a policy based on the Leninist-Stalinist theory of the nationality question. National hostility has not ceased for 30 years in Palestine, and at times has been aggravated to butchery and pogroms. For 30 years the brotherly Soviet Republics have been prospering peacefully in national agreement, in cooperation and friendship. The nonsensical nature of assertions of the inborn hatred of some nations for others, of the inability of some peoples to live in peace with others has been proved by experience. In every people not yet emerged from capitalist slavery there are classes which cannot live with other peoples without disagreements, without the exploitation and oppression of weaker people. And there are classes, workers and peasants, which can live and wish to live in national friendship with the workers of other peoples.

What is there to show for 30 years of British domination in Palestine? Constant deception of Arabs and Jews, false promises to both of them, the instigation of Jews against Arabs and Arabs against Jews; the deprivation of both peoples of any national independence. British politicians are now shedding crocodile tears: you see, they tried all means to get the Arabs and Jews to agree - they sat down around a table, they put people in four-cornered prison rooms, they hanged people, they flogged them.... Nothing helps!

Yes, all the means of oppression have been tried and one simple method alone has not been tried - not once have they left the population of Palestine in peace, not once have they given the workers of that country an opportunity to come together freely and agree on forms of co-habitation. For 30 years the British gendarmes brutally treated Palestine as a country of savages who allegedly were unable to take a single step independently. In three decades the wretched British guardians have brought the peaceful peoples to complete despair, have vexed them to folly... What is there that should cause surprise, then, in the fact that terror from all sides reigns in Palestine? There it is, is it not a subject for admiration - the bourgeois order in all its beauty, when a country has become impassable, <sup>who</sup> the conquerors, having frightened all the population, themselves live in constant fear.

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PART I

6th October, 1947

TRAVDA (cont'd)

Now the British politicians have magnanimously admitted their insolvency, their bankruptcy in policy. Yes, there must be a trial for such insolvency, they must be shamed publicly before all peoples! Why does a fraudulent bankrupt lose his credit on the British Stock Exchange, why will no one entrust his enterprise to him, but at a meeting of peoples the question should not be raised of whether bankrupt politicians can claim further right to administer colonies and peoples?

In 30 years who prevented the British rulers from making a peaceful and exemplary country with a prosperous culture out of Palestine? Perhaps it was the Communists or the Bolsheviks who got in the way? The fraudulent political bankrupts of all countries usually try to place the blame on them for their own crimes, for their own predatory policy. No, neither the Communists as a whole nor the Bolsheviks hindered the British Conservatives, Liberals and Labour Party followers in Palestine. In all their provocative policy in that country the British masters relied on the most Rightist groups among Arabs and among Jews, and only the most inveterate nationalists were their order boys. The entire British policy lay in fomenting national passions, in corrupting both peoples. The democratic elements were suppressed and persecuted. In this respect the Labour Party followers are absolutely no different from the die-hard Conservatives. Lo, the results: there are Arabs who hate Jews, there are Jews who hate Arabs, and there are the tremendous majority of Arabs and Jews who could come to terms and speak a common language, but absolutely all Jews in Palestine and absolutely all the Arabs hate the British masters, and so great is this hatred that the masters have been struck dumb with terror and wish to come out with a whole skin from the hell into which they have plunged a peaceful country. In order to go on "administering" Palestine in the same spirit of terror, Britain needs to send fresh troops, to inundate all cities and hamlets with soldiers and police, to execute and hang thousands of people, to close Palestine tight from outside scrutiny. The old pre-war Britain would not have halted at expense and would have turned streams of blood into rivers. But such an intense colonial terror is too much for the pocket of present-day Britain. This is why certain British politicians are prepared to exchange the role of independent master in Palestine for the capacity of gendarme and hiring hangman: you see, it's your dollars and our nooses. We'll strangle them together.

The British bankruptcy in Palestine is simply the most striking example of the general national-colonial bankruptcy of imperialism. Is it not this same thing which is going on in Indonesia, in Greece, in Southern Korea, everywhere where the bourgeois "order" is introduced to the accompaniment of artillery and machine gun fire?

And, parallel to these colonial-nationality payasages, is the growing friendship between the peoples in the countries of the new democracy where for centuries there was uninterrupted national enmity, kindled either by the Turkish pashas, or the Austrian gendarmes, or the German -fascist provocateurs.

These are clear illustrations for the imperialistic doctrine of the national hostility of rival-peoples, and for the Bolshevik doctrine of the national friendship of working-peoples. Millions are now learning, the peoples of the entire world are learning, not from books alone, but, most of all, from examples out of life itself.

(2 columns) (Full translation)

TRAVDA 6.10.47

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PALESTINE

Registry Number } E 9427/957/31.  
 FROM } January  
 No. } Receipt  
 Dated } 34/296/47  
 Received in Registry } 6 Oct  
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Colonial Secretary's Press Release Reactions.  
 Refer Receipt of 700 E 9193/951/31)  
 Encloses copy of article by Michel Chikha  
 which appeared in newspaper "Le Jour"  
 under heading "Revue de l'Asie Orientale"

Last Paper

9426

(Minutes.)

Copy go.

*Boyle*  
 (T.E. CABLE)  
 17/10

References

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NA <sup>clerk</sup> Dept.

12 Oct. 13

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(How disposed of)

2, 60  
✓ Oct 21

(Action completed)

*L. E. 24/10*

(Index)

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29/10/46

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35. - Michel Chiha. - A Roman Catholic banker of Beirut, born 1893. A member of the Board of Administration of the Banque de Syrie. Was a Deputy in 1926 at which time he assisted in the drafting of the Lebanese Constitution. A brother-in-law of the President and relative of Henri Pharaon; has long been power behind the Constitutional Party. Virtually directs the policy of Henri Pharaon and in major issues is always consulted by the President of whom however he has of late become critical. The local "Eminence grise". Formerly an advocate of a Christian Lebanon protected against Moslem domination is now in favour of the maintenance of the Lebanon as at present constituted as favouring the continued influence of his family and the exclusion of their rival Emile Eddé. He is owner of Le Jour (to which he contributes a signed article daily) and, until it ceased publication, of the "Eastern Times". A man of wide culture (chiefly Latin) retiring and studious by nature and deeply religious, he is politically far-seeing though somewhat handicapped by his aloofness. A Jesuit in outlook. Though imbued with French culture and in favour of close relations (particularly economic) with France on the basis of independence, he is pro-British and has at intervals written statesman-like articles in his newspaper (e.g. in connexion with Anglo-Egyptian dispute). Anti-Zionist and anti-Communist. While disposed to cooperate with neighbouring Arab States on the basis of the Arab League, he is fundamentally suspicious of Moslem influence - a sentiment which colours his whole political philosophy - and his pro-British sympathies are tempered by some distrust of British pro-Moslem policy.

A shrewd and cautious financier; respected but not popular.

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Cypher/OTP CABINET DISTRIBUTION  
FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 9-33

Sir A. Kirkbride  
No. 301  
10th October, 1947

D. 1.25 p.m. 10th October, 1947  
R. 1.40 p.m. 10th October, 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York,  
Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut (please pass to  
Damascus as my telegram No. 76), Cairo,  
Jedda, B.M.E.O. Cairo and Saving to Jerusalem.

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

As Arab politicians and leaders become convinced that His Majesty's Government really mean their announcement on the subject of evacuation of Palestine new fears, suspicions and plans are making their appearance.

2. I have sensed a belief that the new British scheme is to withdraw British troops from Palestine but to leave Arab Legion and Transjordan Frontier Force behind with the rôle of containing Jews who would be permitted to seize power in the areas where they form a majority and of ensuring that Arab areas of Palestine are inherited by Transjordan, the member of the Arab League over which Great Britain exercises greatest influence.

The enquiries which are referred to in third paragraph of Beirut telegram No. 712 appear to me to constitute an interesting confirmation of this line of thought.

3. According to certain local sources of information anti-Hasimite parties are actively recruiting armed bands in Syria and the Lebanon with an idea of intervening in Palestine when evacuation begins in the name of the Arab Higher Committee, i.e. the Mufti. Sudden appearance of the Mufti in the Lebanon would fit in with such a scheme.

It is interesting in this connexion also that King Abdullah complained to me yesterday the Arab Higher Executive were engaged actively in endeavouring to seduce members of the Arab Legion and Transjordan Frontier Force from their respective allegiances with a view to using them in their commands when fighting in Palestine broke out.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda, B.M.E.O. as my telegrams Nos. 352, 87, 51 and 40 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York,  
Bagdad, Cairo, Jedda and B.M.E.O. Cairo]

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Reference:-

FO

371 / 61881

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11 OCT 1947  
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Cypher.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM

Mr. Evans  
No. 90.  
October 6th, 1947.

R. October 6th, 1947.

E 66  
F 9434  
11 OCT

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 64 Saving.

Cairo Embassy No. 59 Saving.  
Cairo B.M.E.O. No. 44 Saving.  
Bagdad No. 74 Saving.  
Damascus No. 218 Saving.  
Jedda No. 79 Saving.  
Amman No. 77 Saving.

IMPORTANT.

RESTRICTED.

Palestine.

Lebanese Prime Minister sent for me this morning and asked whether he could be informed of the tenour of your statement to Arab and Jewish leaders or better still be furnished with the text thereof. He said that according to the delegate of the Palestine Arabs to the Arab League Council, your statement went further than the Colonial Secretary's speech and that the Arab and Jewish leaders were informed of decision by His Majesty's Government to withdraw from Palestine unconditionally i.e. whether there is a settlement or not. Arab Delegate was I ascertained not (repeat not) present at your meeting. Riad Bey added that it was important that on the eve of the meeting of the Arab League Council the Arabs should know exactly what the position was.

2. I hope you will be able to furnish me by telegram with material to enable me to reply to the Lebanese Prime Minister.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61881



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NOTES ON INTERVIEWS WITH DR. KHALIDI AND MR. BEN GURION  
2ND OCTOBER 1947.

To both I said that I thought it was incumbent on me after my return from England, where I had been in close touch with the situation, to impress upon them the statement recently made by the Secretary of State at UNO meant exactly what it said. Great Britain is sick and tired of trying to get agreement between Arabs and Jews and is no longer in any mood to get mixed up in disturbances between them. She is most desirous of leaving Palestine with a happy solution and in peace but she is determined if Arabs and Jews do not agree to leave without that condition.

To Dr. Khalidi I said that I understood he had remarked to the Chief Secretary that they had heard all this from Great Britain before. I pointed out that they had not heard this proposition before but what they had heard was that Britain was prepared to leave after having arranged independence for Palestine. Their present intention was something quite new. I suggested to them that they should take note of what was happening in India and although they had both made statements that they would be glad to see Great Britain go I wondered whether they had thought out to the full the possible implications and whether by their actions they wished to bring chaos and bloodshed on the ordinary inhabitants of the country who had benefited so greatly under the British during the past 25-years. It was my most earnest advice to them that it was their last chance of coming to an agreement and that they should strain every nerve to do so and before it is too late to consider to the utmost what an unconditional withdrawal of the British would mean did they not do so.

Dr. Khalidi produced the usual Arab reply. The Jews had been invading Palestine over the past three decades, that the Arabs had seen this situation coming during the whole of that period, they had always wanted to come to an agreement with the Jews with whom individually they had no quarrel but the Jews by their aggressiveness had always prevented agreement, their invasion and expansion was bound to go on and therefore the Arabs had no alternative but to fight it out. They had in fact fully considered the matter and they felt there was no alternative. I merely said that I was sorry that he took this view but I hoped he would change it on more sober reflection having in view what I had already told him. I was not in the least surprised by Dr. Khalidi's attitude as I have always considered him quite unbalanced and nearly mad.

On the other hand Mr. Ben Gurion was much more susceptible. He asked me whether I felt there was the slightest chance of agreement, he said that it was a major point in their policy that they must find a way to get on with the Arabs and live in peace amongst them and that anything that could be done towards that end they must do. I told him that if they could assuage Arab fears regarding future Jewish expansion eastwards and the domination of the Arabs by the Jews that there was some slight chance that they might still get together. He said they were quite prepared to reassure the Arabs on these two points but they would have to make one reservation in that they would not discuss the stoppage of Jewish immigration. He said that he himself felt that the mass of the people in Palestine wished peace and that the fear of Arab disturbances was clearly exaggerated. I told him that although this might have been the case a short time ago the Arab situation had undoubtedly deteriorated and that if I were he I would not count too much on that theory and moreover all must realise that as long as we were being stabbed in the back by the Jews they could not expect us to give them full protection against the Arabs. We were not able to look both ways.

I then turned to the question of the provision to us of all the information at the disposal of the Hagana intelligence services. He attempted to say that it was a point of honour for individual Jews

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Reference: FO 371/61881



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E 9442

1947

PALESTINE

11 OCT

Registry Number

E9442/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

M' Bowker

Dated

6 Oct

Received in Registry

1940

9 Oct

" "

Palestine Arab League Brochure news

Arab League Brochure newspaper of 8 Oct reports Hassan al Banna telegraphed DREAM Beirut stating Brochure considered only way to save Palestine in by force and offering to place 10,000 young men at disposal of Arab League as first detachment which is prepared to move at first signal.

Last Paper.

9434

(Minutes.)

*J. B. B.*  
C.S.E. CABLE

11/10

References.

*R. G.*  
*V. K. X.*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, ~~Mathews~~  
P.O.  
✓ Oct 13

(Action completed.)

*J. G. M. 11/10*

(Index)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper.

9443

32008 F.O.P.

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Reference:-

FO 371/61881

En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 71  
E 9442

Mr Bowker D. 7. 03 p.m. 9th October, 1947.  
No. 1990  
9th October, 1947. R. 9. 07 p.m. 9th October, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem  
Beirut  
Damascus Saving  
Amman Saving  
Bagdad Saving  
Jedda Saving

Subject Palestine.

Moslem Brethren Society's newspaper of 8th October, reports Hassan Al Banna telegraphed Azzan in Beirut on occasion of Arab League Council's meeting, stating Moslem Brethren consider only way to save Palestine is by force and offering to place 10,000 young men at disposal of Arab League as first detachment which is prepared to move at first signal. Same newspaper urges Arab states to open voluntary recruitment offices to form military detachments and urges Arab Governments to prepare their armies to participate in a decisive campaign to expel colonisers and Zionists from the Holy Land.

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Reference:-

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1947

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PALESTINE

74  
E 9444

11 OCT

Registry Number

E 9444/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. *to Evans (Beirut)*

Dated *7 23*

Received in Registry } *8 Oct*  
*11 Oct*

*debatable attitude towards Palestine situation*

*Refus to Beirut at to 64 Savoy*

*(E 9434 / 957 / 31.) Record of conversation with debate Pine House regarding Arab attitude towards the Colonial Secretary's statement on withdrawal of troops from Palestine*

Last Paper.

*E 9443*

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*g. h. Mathison (C.O.)*  
*13 Oct*

(Minutes.)

*The announcement of our finding by Mr. Lush-Jones seems to be having a delayed-action effect. The Arabs are at least taking it seriously.*

*Publ*  
*(C.F. CABLE)*  
*11/10*

*RD*  
*11/10*

(Action completed.)

*JSM*

(Index)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper.

*E 9445*

32008 F.O.P.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61881

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Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 044

Mr. Evans.

No. 725

8th October, 1947.

D. 10.12 a.m. 9th October, 1947.

R. 3.42 p.m. 9th October, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo; British Middle East Office Cairo; Jerusalem.

Bagdad; Damascus; Jedda; Amman ) Saving

SECRET

My telegram No. 19 to Jerusalem (repeated to you No. 64 Saving).

Palestine.

I was received by the Lebanese Prime Minister this afternoon and gave him the gist of what the High Commissioner for Palestine told Dr. Khalidi and Ben Gurion on the subject of the Colonial Secretary's statement. I pointed out in particular that His Excellency had stressed to both leaders the fact that this was their last chance of coming to terms.

2. Riad Bey said he realised both the gravity of the situation and the import of the Colonial Secretary's speech. He proposed in fact to make the statement the basis of the Arab League's deliberations. He himself had no doubt it was a new development which called for new tactics on the part of the Arabs. He added that judging by such contacts as he had had with the Arab delegates the statement had created a favourable impression.

3. I told Riad Bey that speaking personally it seemed to me that there were only two alternatives before the Arabs:

- (1) open conflict with the Jews or
- (2) some arrangement acceptable to both parties.

Riad Bey said he agreed and added that if a conflict occurred he had no doubt that in the first stages the Arabs would suffer severe losses though in the end he was confident they would win the day. As regards some arrangement acceptable to both parties he thought short of a miracle no agreement was possible. His personal view however was that the situation at the United Nations Assembly might develop somewhat on the

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following lines. "No solution would be found acceptable to the Jews and Arabs. It would then be realised that if the British evacuate Palestine (as in that case they were bound to do in accordance with the Colonial Secretary's statement) no alternative forces would be available to put into effect any decision. In these circumstances it might well be decided to postpone the whole question for a year or so. Something like the status quo might then be inevitable and he personally thought this would suit the Arabs who might even be prepared to accept limited immigrants". Riad Bey said his instinct was that if the Palestine question could be postponed in this way His Majesty's Government would be in a position to press forward with solution of the "Egyptian" problem and, assured of Arab goodwill, to devote their energies to negotiations on the question of Sudan and Palestine.

Cairo pass to British Middle East Office as my telegram No.170.

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Reference:-

**FO**

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E 9445

1947

PALESTINE

II INT

Registry Number

E 9445/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

L. Evans

No.

(Bury)

Dated

728

Received in Registry

10 Oct.

11 Oct.

Arab League meeting in Palestine.

Record of conversation with Lebanese Prime Minister during which the Arab attitude to H.M.G.'s proposals for Palestine were discussed.

Last Paper.

E 9444.

(Minutes.)

Now please see E 9475/754/6

*[Signature]*  
14/10

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 be. hualkesin (c.o)

8 M.O.H

M139.

Admly

.ant.

16 Oct.

Latd W Tan 10496

13 Oct.

(Action completed.)

L.C.M. 27/10

(Index)

*[Signature]*  
27/10/48

Next Paper.

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Reference:-

FO

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78 E

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Cypher/OTP CABINET DISTRIBUTION E 9448

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE. 11 OCT

Mr. Evans, D: 1.8 p.m. 10th October, 1947  
No. 728  
10th October, 1947 R: 2.49 p.m. 10th October, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York,  
Cairo,  
British Middle East Office,  
Bagdad,  
Amman,  
Jedda,  
Jerusalem  
Damascus Saving.

IMPORTANT.  
SECRET.

E 9484/951/31

My telegram No. 727; Arab League meeting; Palestine.

I saw Lebanese Prime Minister last night immediately after the meeting. He said that on the whole things had gone very smoothly and that various obstacles had been overcome without undue difficulty. Results were in general what he had anticipated. Firstly, secret Blydan decisions would not (repeat not) be officially communicated to His Majesty's Government and United States Government. They still stood but reference to them in communiqué was in general terms. Secondly, Colonial Secretary's statement had been basis of Council's deliberations and general attitude of Council as far as His Majesty's Government were concerned was favourable. Speaking for precautionary military measures he said that they were inevitable as it was essential that, if the British withdrew, the vacuum should be filled. As regards financial aid he said that this would now be open and above-board and that allocations to Palestine would appear openly in budgets of various Arab States.

2. Riad Bey appeared to be more confident of the ability of the Arabs to stand up to the Jews than he was before the meeting. He will [sic] clearly pleased with results particularly with the part which he had played as Chairman.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 27, and Cairo to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 175.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York].  
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E 0462

1947

PALESTINE

13 OCT

Registry Number

E9462/951/31

FROM

70 Minute

No.

11 Cable

Dated

25/9

Received in Registry

13 Oct

Arab League Political Committee meeting.  
Transmit summary of Arab reactions to UNSCOP Report, focus list of decisions reached. Also gives reactions of Arabs to announcement of UN Policy by General Secretary.

Last Paper

9445

(Minutes.)

2 P.P.

Now please see E9551/1714/9

J 15/10

References

In P.P. B.R.O. bise tel 829 16/10

523 Sawing 16/10

J 22/10

(Print)

In P.P. B.R.O. bise tel 0.843 24/10

J 5/11

(How disposed of)

In P.P. B.R.O. bise tel 853 1/11

J 6/11

In P.P. D. no 862 7/11

J 15/11

(Action completed)

J E 10/10

(Index)

J 2/10

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E8750  
Flag J

The meeting ended on the 19th when a communiqué was issued stating that the Committee had decided that U.N.S.C.O.P.'s proposals involved a flagrant sacrifice of the natural rights of the Arabs of Palestine to independence, and that the Arab States were determined to resist the implementation of these proposals by all practical and effective means. They would indeed be unable to repress the sentiments of their own peoples. They, therefore, offered the Arabs of Palestine all the assistance and sacrifices within their power. The communiqué ended with a conventional expression of support for Egypt.

E8758  
Flag K

According to Samir Pasha the Committee decided:

- (a) To reject the U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations.
- (b) To give effective assistance to the Palestine Arabs if these recommendations were implemented.
- (c) To instruct their delegates at Lake Success to develop all possible diplomatic contacts to further the Arab case.

E8793  
Flag L

(d) To <sup>disparage</sup> ~~discourage~~ notes to H.M.G. and the U.S. Government. (H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus received a note, based largely on the communiqué, on the 22nd September and others will doubtless follow).

E8794 FLAG M

- (e) The Council of the Arab League would meet on October 2nd to consider implementing the "Bludan" decisions. (See below). *The date of the meeting was originally the 6th, but was put forward to the 2nd.*
- (f) To pass a resolution in support of Egypt.

The most significant result of this meeting was their decision, ostensibly on juridical grounds, to refer to the Council of the Arab League the question of implementing the "Bludan" decisions. We do not possess the actual text of these decisions but, according to Samir Pasha, they were five in number, as follows:

- E8744 - FLAG G (a) No new economic concessions would be granted to the Anglo-Saxons.
- E8745 - FLAG H (b) There would be a moral boycott of the Anglo-Saxons.
- (c) The Arabs would consider the withdrawal of existing concessions.
- (d) The Arabs would refer the Palestine decision to the United Nations.
- (e) The Arabs would not co-operate with the Anglo-Saxons in any international bodies.

*These Bludan decisions were originally adopted in May 1946 and were to be implemented in the event of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee being put into effect.*  
Iraq/

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Iraq appears to be the only member whole-heartedly in favour of economic sanctions (the only important part of these decisions) and it seems doubtful whether she would put them into effect unless Saudi Arabia did the same. Brigadier Clayton suggested that it might be worth while to approach King Ibn Saud to withhold his agreement. By the time of the Council's meeting on October 2nd, however, H.M.G's declaration of their policy on Palestine will have been made and the situation will thus have altered. It would appear preferable, therefore, to take no further action until we have had time to judge Arab reactions to this declaration of policy.

~~SECRET~~  
E8673  
FLAG C

*J. Gable*  
(T.E. CABLE)  
25/4

*R. Curran*  
25/9

Now pl. see also Amman let. <sup>1/10</sup> 288

(copy att'd) giving the text of the decisions of the Beirut (Lofar) meeting. (4) is the most significant. I agree that no further action is required at present. Our statement in the Assembly Cttee will considerably modify the situation.

*B.A. Burrows*  
25.9

Thanks. Most useful.  
Let us consider on Sept. 25th whether any action is required before the meeting of the Arab League in the light of Arab reactions to our Palestine Statement  
*C.A.B. 279*

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Arab Reaction to the Announcement of H.M.G.'s Policy on Palestine.

Arab reaction to Mr. Creech Jones' declaration to the United Nations Assembly at New York may be summarised as follows:-

Official Reactions The Arab Delegation to the United Nations welcomed what it called a "belated declaration" and expressed the hope that H.M.G.'s decision would not later be reversed under Zionist pressure. With this one exception, there has been no public comment from official Arab sources, and this will probably be deferred until the meeting of the Council of the Arab League on the 7th October. In Cairo, official circles have expressed scepticism regarding the sincerity of the declaration, but in Baghdad their reaction was one of sober satisfaction, while the Lebanese Prime Minister warmly welcomed the declaration and congratulated H.M.G. on their decision. He regarded it as favourable to the Arabs and thought the situation in Palestine after the British withdrawal might develop in one of two ways. Either the Jews might abandon their intransigence and accept a compromise on the basis of the status quo with limited immigration or, and this he considered more likely, a serious clash would develop as in India. No official reactions have been reported from the Transjordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia or the Yemen.

Press Comment. Press comment has been restricted by the distractions of internal politics and the Egyptian cholera epidemic and has, on the whole, been less favourable, varying from ~~astonishment~~ disbelief to restrained welcome for a "good beginning". Only two newspapers applauded the declaration as doing justice to Arab aspirations, while several described it as a feint designed to force the United States to share

Britain's/

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E 9462/951/71

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INDEXED

Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. 18 OCT 1947

21 OCT 1947

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

O U T W A R D T E L E G R A M

CYPHER (TYPEX)

O.D.

FROM: COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 8.25 p.m. 16th Oct., 1947)

D. No. 829 SECRET

My telegram 20th September D. No. 778.

PALESTINE.

Immediate reaction in Arab States to Colonial Secretary's statement, particularly in press, was one of scepticism: line was taken that warning of United Kingdom withdrawal might be political feint, later interpretation of which would show whether only United Kingdom interests were being served. His Majesty's Representatives in the various Arab States were instructed therefore to make it clear to Governments to which they were accredited that Colonial Secretary's statement meant exactly what it said. Arab Governments now appear to realize its significance and are showing a sober satisfaction at knowledge that we shall not (repeat not) implement a solution unacceptable to Arabs, tempered with alarm at possible consequences of our withdrawal.

2. This state of mind is reflected in communique of 9th October issued after meeting at Beirut of Arab League Council at which resolutions were approved recommending that Governments of Arab States should (a) take military precautions on Palestine frontiers; (b) provide funds to give effective help to Arabs in Palestine; (c) in face of threat of Zionist forces and their terrorist organisations, consider measures to protect interests of Palestine Arabs after United Kingdom withdrawal. Text of resolutions as given in /

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Reference: FO 371/61881

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in communique follows by Savingram.

3. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Syrian and Egyptian forces have moved up to Palestine frontier. His Majesty's United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires, Damascus, accordingly reminded Acting Prime Minister that, until United Kingdom troops and administration were withdrawn from Palestine, His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom remained responsible for administration, defence and security of Palestine. Mr. Dundas added that, in his opinion, sending of Syrian troops to neighbourhood of frontier was provocative and would probably result in a deterioration of internal situation of Palestine.

4. In this connexion enquiries have been received from several quarters whether, in view of Arab League threat to use their forces in Palestine, we intended to cease supplies of arms to Arab Governments. Arms and equipment have been provided for Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan in normal discharge of our treaty obligations. We have also been prepared to sell to Syria up to minimum amount required for purposes of internal security. Our view is that States concerned have right to maintain limited forces for defence and internal security and that they have not (repeat not) built up their forces with express purpose of intervening in Palestine. We still hope for peaceful settlement, but in event of conflict between Jews and Arabs it would no doubt be open to United Nations to make recommendations about stopping supply of arms to this area. Until then we regard any suggestions that we should take unilateral action as premature and hypothetical.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office  
 C.R.O. (King  
 Charles St.)

Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin  
 Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)  
 Mr. I.P. Garrahan  
 Mr. K. Barnes (4)

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Reference:-

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E 462/97/21

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R. W. W. W.

21 OCT 1947

With the Compliments of the  
Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth  
Relations.

18 OCT 1947

OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

(BY AIR MAIL)

O.D.

FROM: COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 16th Oct., 1947)

D. No. 523 SAVING

PALESTINE: ARAB LEAGUE COUNCILS RESOLUTIONS.

Following is text of resolutions on Palestine as given in  
communique issued by Arab League Council of 9th October. Begins.

1. The Council consider that the Bludan secret decisions, which  
were to be executed in the event of the report of the United Kingdom -  
United States Committee of Enquiry being accepted and a plan devised  
for their execution are still valid and should be executed if any  
solution affecting the rights of Palestine to be an independent  
Arab State is applied.

2. As regards the decision of the United Kingdom Government  
recently announced to abandon the Mandate over Palestine and to  
withdraw their troops and administration, and in view of the presence  
of the Zionist forces and terrorist organisations which threaten the  
safety of the Arabs of Palestine, the Council consider that the Arab  
States should take military precautions on the Palestine frontiers.  
Therefore, the Council suggest that it should be recommended to the  
Governments of the Arab States that they should proceed to take these  
military precautions and at the same time that States limitrophe to  
Palestine should facilitate the participation and co-operation of  
non-limitrophe States.

3. As regards the execution of the previous decisions to give  
effective help to the Arabs of Palestine, the Council recommend to  
the /

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**FO** 371 / 61881

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the Governments of the States members of the League that they should begin giving material and moral help to the Arabs of Palestine, in order to strengthen and encourage them in defending themselves and their existence. The Council also recommend to the States of the League that they should produce immediately the necessary funds for this purpose and that these funds should be spent under the supervision of a special committee. Ends.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

C.R.O. (King  
Charles St.)

Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin  
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)  
Mr. I.P. Garran  
Mr. K. Barnes (4)

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27 OCT 1947 COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

h.w.  
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OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM DOMINIONS OFFICE

(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

CYPHER (TYPEX)

9462 951 31

O.D.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 9.05 p.m. 24th Oct., 1947.)

D. No. 843 SECRET.

PALESTINE.

Following is our interim appreciation of way Palestine situation as a whole is developing.

2. We are in general fairly satisfied with effect of our undertaking, to withdraw, which has brought Arabs and Jews and other Governments nearer to facing realities.
3. It is fairly clear that United States Government are unwilling to incur more than a limited share of responsibility for garrisoning or administration of Palestine, and best result from our point of view would be that Arabs and Jews should agree and should ask us to remain in Palestine for a limited transitional period to help them put agreement into effect. United States and Soviet support for partition makes it less likely that Jews will make any concessions. Jewish Agency, however, do not (repeat not) seem to be at all optimistic that, should a plan of partition be recommended by Assembly, an effective instrument of enforcement will be agreed upon and brought into being by United Nations in time to replace our administration. On Arab side, we are inclined to think that there may be tendency towards compromise, as illustrated by speech of Pakistan Delegate to United Nations on 13th October, who, while reiterating his opposition to partition, said that if this solution were recommended boundaries should be so drawn as to include roughly the same number of Arabs in Jewish state as Jews in Arab state. In adherence to terms under which we referred Palestine question to United Nations we have assumed in discussions a somewhat passive/

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Reference: FO 371/61881

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-2-

passive role and shall be careful not (repeat not) to become prematurely associated with any specific compromise proposal.

4. Our view of threats of direct action by Arab states is that they should be treated with caution. We have, however, authorised our representatives in Arab states to remind Governments to which they are accredited of our interim responsibility for administration of Palestine in terms similar to representations already made to Syrian Government (my telegram 16th October D. No. 829 paragraph 3), and to deny rumours that we have any secret arrangements with any Arab Government about action by Arab forces in Palestine after our withdrawal.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin  
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)  
Mr. J.E. Gable

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Reference:-

**FO** 371 / 61881

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With the Compliments of the  
Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth  
Relations

4 NOV 1947

**Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office**

E 91  
PW

(This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.)

CYPHER (TYPEX)

O.D.

TO: CANADA (GOVERNMENT)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

9462 / 957 / 71

(Sent 8.30 p.m. 1st Nov., 1947.)

D. No. 853 SECRET.

My telegram 24th October D. No. 843.

PALESTINE: SOVIET POLICY.

Following is our provisional appreciation of motives for Soviet support of UNSCOP's majority proposal for partition.

2. We do not (repeat not) view this support as evidence of new Soviet attitude of objectivity and co-operation. Support for independence of national minorities is basic Soviet doctrinal principle, which may be turned to advantage in case of Jews in Palestine as precedent for support of claims of Kurds and Armenians.

3. Primary aim of Soviet Government is probably to debar United Kingdom and United States Governments from maintaining their strategic position in Eastern Mediterranean. Best method of achieving this no doubt seems to them to lie in encouraging partition, since thereafter either party is likely to oppose establishment of bases in territory of the other. Soviet Government may well also take view that implementation of majority plan would cause trouble in Middle East, thus adding to difficulties of United Kingdom and United States Governments.

4. Establishment of Communist state in Palestine or at least in Jewish areas, may possibly be ultimate Soviet object. State would be organised by Communist-indoctrinated illegal immigrants from Eastern Europe (my telegram 23rd October D. No. 532 Saying, paragraph 2). Emphasis in Soviet statement on economic unity of Palestine is perhaps intended to facilitate extension of Communist influence from Jewish to/

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FO 371 / 61881

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- 2 -

to Arab Palestine and thence throughout Arab Middle East. However, His Majesty's United Kingdom Ambassador, Moscow, has pointed out that it is doubtful whether hope of introducing Communism through Jewish immigrants bulks very largely with Soviet Government who are well aware of extent to which Zionism is connected with United States big business and of fact that a Jewish state extending over all or part of Palestine would be dependent on United States for a long time to come.

5. As regards implementation and transitional period, Soviet statement was vague. It might suit them on general grounds that we should be responsible for implementing an unpopular settlement.

6. Soviet Government have not (repeat not), in our opinion, maintained a consistent view of Palestine problem. Now that need to take a definite stand has become more urgent, their tendency is to hedge. Their hint of need for revised frontiers is probably intended to secure ground for manoeuvre up to last moment.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. F.T.A. Ashton-Gwatkin  
 Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)  
 Mr. J.G.S. Beith

RECEIVED IN C B.  
 5 NOV 1947

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Reference:-  
**FO**  
 371 / 61881

8 NOV 1947 93  
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS  
OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM DOMINIONS OFFICE

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (types) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services. E

F 2781/50  
CYPHER (TYPEX)

O.D.

9462 951 21  
TO : CANADA (GOVT)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 1.35.p.m. 7th November, 1947)

IMPORTANT

D No. 862 SECRET

My telegram 3rd November D No. 854. Palestine.

We have been further considering U.S. proposal and we see strong objection to it on following grounds :-

- (a) it would commit us to a lateline based on considerations other than withdrawal of our troops and administration in the shortest possible time;
- (b) it would commit us to remain in Palestine until 1st July, 1948, even should an earlier withdrawal prove practicable;
- (c) unless U.N. decision were based on an agreed settlement, proposal would inevitably involve us in enforcement of partition and would wreck our withdrawal programme.

2. U.S. proposal is therefore unacceptable to us and U.K. Delegation in New York have been asked to make this clear.

Copy to :

Foreign Office - Mr I.M. Kirkpatrick  
Mr. J.I.C. Finch (4)  
Mr. J.G.S. Beith

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1947

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E 9463 94

13 OCT

PALESTINE

Registry Number

9463/951/31

FROM F.O minute

No.

M. Ganan

Dated

6 Oct.

Received in Registry

13 Oct.

The Arab League and Palestine

Attempts to discourage SALEM JABR from pressing proposal to bring up to date & strengthen Sudan decisions have been unsuccessful. Proposal is to be considered at Arab League meeting beginning on 9th Oct.

Last Paper

9462

(Minutes.)

Please see E 9219

*J. J.*  
16/10

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

*J. J.*  
17/10

(Index)

*J. J.*  
20/10/48

Next Paper

9477

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259

E

E 9477<sup>98</sup>

1947

PALESTINE

13 OCT

Registry Number

E9477/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. del.

No.

N.York.

Dated

2861.  
10 Oct.

Received in Registry

13 Oct.

U.S. Statement to Palestine Committee

gives text of U.S. statement to Palestine Committee, re future government of Palestine.

Last Paper.

9463

(Minutes.)

Now please see E 9501

*[Signature]* 5/10

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8) Mr. Mathieson, P.O.  
(on E9568)

✓ 18 Oct.

Tel) New York 3460

[Rptd. Washington 10512]  
13 Oct.

8) Mr. Mathieson, P.O.  
(on E9568) 18 Oct.

(Action completed.)

*[Signature]*

(Index)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper.

9480

32008 F.O.P.

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2861

D. 9.55 p.m. 10th October, 1947

10th October, 1947

R. 4.12 a.m. 11th October, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem,  
Washington Saving,

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text.

[Begins]

1. The problem of the future Government of Palestine confronts the General Assembly of the United Nations with a heavy and complex responsibility. The General Assembly, having assumed responsibility for making recommendations to the United Kingdom on the subject, must do everything within its power to evolve a practical solution consistent with the principles laid down in the United Nations charter.

2. The United States delegation feels that the urgency of the problem is so great that the General Assembly must recommend a solution at this session. The degree of urgency has been brought to our attention by continued violence in Palestine, by the context of the Special Committee's report, and by the statement of the delegate from the United Kingdom, regarding the recommendations of the committee and future British responsibilities in Palestine.

3. During the past weeks this committee has had the benefit of the views of several members of this committee, and has heard statements by the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine on behalf of the peoples primarily concerned. The United States delegation believes that this discussion has been of material assistance and hopes that it will continue on the broadest basis.

4. It may be recalled that as a result of the first World War a large area of the Near East, including Palestine, was liberated and a number of States gained their independence. The United States having contributed its blood and resources to the winning of that war, felt that it could not divest itself of a certain responsibility for the manner in which the freed territories were disposed of, or for the fate of the peoples liberated at that time. It took the position that these peoples should be prepared for Self-Government and also that a National Home for the Jews should be established in Palestine. The United States Government has subsequently had long and friendly relations with the independent States which were created in the Near East and is

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(3)

8. Both the majority report and the statement of the United Kingdom representative in this Committee raise the problem of carrying into effect the recommendations of the General Assembly. We note for example that the majority report indicates several points at which the majority thought the United Nations could be of assistance. It was suggested that the General Assembly approve certain steps involved in the transitional period, that the United Nations guarantee certain aspects of the settlement concerning Holy Places and minority rights, that the Economic and Social Council appoint three members of the Joint Economic Board, and that the United Nations accept responsibility as administering authority of the City of Jerusalem under an international trusteeship.

9. The United States is willing to participate in a United Nations programme to assist the parties involved in the establishment of a workable political settlement in Palestine. We refer to assistance through the United Nations in meeting economic and financial problems and the problem of internal law and order during the transition period. The latter problem might require the establishment of a special constabulary or police force recruited on a volunteer basis by the United Nations. We do not refer to the possibility of violations by any member in its obligations to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force. We assume that there will be charter observance.

10. In the final analysis the problem of making any solution work rests with the people of Palestine. If new political institutions are to endure, they must provide for early assumption by the people themselves of the responsibility for their own domestic order. Acts of violence against constituted authority and against rival elements of the local population have appeared in Palestine over a period of many years and have greatly increased the difficulties of finding a workable solution to this complex problem. Certain elements have resorted to force and terror to obtain their own particular aims. Obviously this violence must cease if independence is to be more than an empty phrase in the Holy Land.

11. Mr. Chairman, we must now consider how this Committee is to take the next step in dealing with this question. If the Committee favours the principles of the majority plan, we should establish a Sub-Committee to work out the details of a programme which we could recommend to the General Assembly.

12. The recommendations reached by the General Assembly will represent the collective opinion of the world. The problem has thus far defied solution because the parties primarily at interest have been unable to reach a basis of agreement. This is a problem in the solution of which world opinion can be most helpful.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 83.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61881

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Registry  
No. B

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Open

Draft Telegram

U.K. Delegation

New York

no: 3460

date Oct 13/4

cypher

Repeat

Washington

10512

RJ

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

WL 4668-114 20/10/47 G.S.S. Cp. 20

730pm

OUT FILE

102

MOST IMMEDIATE Date

Despatched

SECRET  
GIANT

Your telegram no: 2861 [of October 10<sup>th</sup>:  
Palestine].

Following for Colonial Secretary  
I am anxious that you should, if  
possible before the general discussion  
closes answer implications in para. 7  
of U.S. statement.

~~The British Government's speech that  
all govt. have a responsibility to  
remain content administering  
Palestine in all circumstances during  
process of transition to independence.~~

Urgent instructions are being  
drafted and will, if possible, be  
despatched before noon on October 14<sup>th</sup>.  
Please endeavour to ensure that  
general

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general discussion is kept open  
until they are received.

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provided by the Big Five in proportion to their annual contributions to the United Nations, and

(VI) member states should take the measures prescribed in the Charter against any states which "as from today" might commit aggression against any of the peoples of Palestine.

3. Granados said that he would support the transfer of Jaffa to the Arab State. He contested the use made of population figures by Zafarulla Khan and argued that the provisions of the majority plan for Jewish immigration in the transition period and for the acquisition of citizenship in the Jewish state by Jews living in Jerusalem would ensure a substantial Jewish majority.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 88.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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108

E 9482

1947

PALESTINE

13 OCT

Registry Number

E 9482/957/21

TELEGRAM FROM

Li. A. Kahlbide

No.

Amman

Dated

302.

Received in Registry

11 Oct

13 -

Arab League Meeting, Amman  
Refer Beirut tel 725 (E 9483/957/21)  
Transmit King Abdullah's version of meeting  
with AZZAM NASHA - Co. on Oct 10.  
It is said he would be delighted to receive  
members of committee on Wednesday to lunch.

Last Paper.

9480

References.

(Minutes.)

Now please see E 9551

15/10

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(How disposed of.)

8, Mather  
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Oct 17.

m 139

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a.m.

Admty

16 Oct

(Action completed.)

J.C.M. 27/10

(Index.)

27/10/47

Next Paper.

9483

32008 F.O.P.

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109 E

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

E 9482

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride  
No. 302

D. 2.20 p.m. 11th October, 1947.

13 OCT

11th October, 1947.

R. 7.05 p.m. 11th October, 1947.

Repeated to : United Kingdom Delegation,  
New York  
Bagdad  
Cairo  
Jedda

British Middle East  
Office, Cairo  
Damascus  
Beirut  
Jerusalem - Saving

IMMED LATE  
SECRET

(Beirut please pass to Damascus as my telegram No. 77.)

Arab League meeting.

7256 FO E

Beirut telegram No. 104 to Amman.

Following is King Abdullah's version of his meeting with Azzam, Saleh Jabr and Samir on October 10th.

2. Visitors showed the King a copy of the decisions of the Council and asked him whether, in view of the critical period facing Arabs, he would invite members of the Council to visit him at Amman and so give the lie to rumours of internal disagreement in the League. The King replied that he would be delighted to receive members of the Council to lunch on Monday, adding that it was no fault of his that the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers had avoided Transjordan in the past.

3. Talking to Saleh Jabr and Samir the King observed that he was sure that the Lebanese, Syrians and Saudis were keeping their respective British Ministers fully informed of all developments and it was important that the Hashimite States should also do this, otherwise others might steal a march when it came to disposing of Arab areas of Palestine. Commenting to me the King said that as I was always kept fully informed I would realise that the observation was aimed at Saleh Jabr who he suspected of failing to co-operate as fully as he should with Embassy at Bagdad.

4. Talking to all three the King maintained that it was folly to talk of ejecting Jews from Palestine. He doubted firstly whether the Arabs were capable of doing so and was sure, secondly, that the civilised world would not permit them to do so if they were. He [gp. undec. ? said] that others agreed that the wise thing to do was to quickly come to terms with the Jews after a British withdrawal and to restrict them to as small a part of Palestine as was possible. The King pointed out that he was probably in a better position than any other Arab leader to make a settlement with the Jews but he thought no negotiations should take place until Jews were quite convinced that they could no longer depend on British protection.

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5. The King told me he found Azam much more reasonable in general and less obsessed with Egypt's difficulties. All three visitors were under the impression that the Lebanese authorities were genuinely upset by arrival of Haj Amin el Husseini.

6. Until Samir returns I have no means of checking the accuracy of this statement.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jeddah and British Middle East Office, as my telegrams Nos. 4, 53, 89, 52 and 41 respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, Bagdad, Cairo, Jeddah and British Middle East Office.]

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111

E 9483

1947

PALESTINE

13 OCT

Registry Number

E9483/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

411 Cobras Beirut

Dated

725.

Received in Registry

13 -

Visit of Arab League Delegation, Amman.  
AZZAM PASHA, SALEM JARR and FARRUK PASHA left by air for Amman, to lunch with King Abdallah. Purpose of visit is to persuade King, to extend invitation to Arab League delegation to visit Amman Oct 13.

ADDRESSED AMMAN 104

Last Paper.

9482

(Minutes.)

Now please see E9551

15/10

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Waltham  
80  
✓ Oct 17

8) M.O. 4. W.O.  
M.I. 3a. "

Admty.

A.C.

✓ 16 Oct.

(Action completed.)

27/10

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27/10/48

Next Paper.

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E 8.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION  
FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans  
No. 727

October 10th, 1947.

D. 3.07 p.m. October 10th, 1947.

R. 7.39 p.m. October 10th, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo, British Middle East Office (Embassy  
please pass as my telegram No. 174), Bagdad,  
Jedda, Amman, Jerusalem, United Kingdom  
Delegation New York.

Foreign Office please pass as my telegram No. 26.

Following communique was issued late on October 9th  
following meeting of the Arab League Council.

[Begins]

The Council of the Arab League held their third meeting at Aley on October 9th, 1947 at 1500 hours under the Presidency of the Prime Minister Riad Solh. After the messages addressed to the General Secretariat had been read, the President of the Council read the summary of the decisions taken by the sub-committee composed of the heads of the delegations of the Arab States dealing with the precautions which should be taken for the defence of Palestine in the light of latest developments, the general situation, and the possible developments arising out of the decisions of the British Government as Mandatory Power in respect of their policy towards Palestine. After discussing these decisions, the following resolutions were approved by the members of the Council of the League.

1. The Council consider that the Bludan secret decisions, which were to be executed in the event of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry being accepted and a plan devised for their execution are still valid and should be executed if any solution affecting the rights of Palestine to be an independent Arab State is applied.

2. As regards the decision of the British Government recently announced to abandon the Mandate over Palestine and to withdraw their troops and administration, and in view of the presence of the Zionist forces and terrorist organisations which threaten the safety of the Arabs of Palestine, the Council consider that the Arab States should take military precautions on the Palestine frontiers. Therefore, the Council suggest that it should be recommended to the Governments of the Arab States that they should proceed to take these military precautions and at the same time that States limitrophe to Palestine should facilitate the participation and co-operation of non-limitrophe States.

3. As regards the execution of the previous decisions to give effective help to the Arabs of Palestine, the Council recommend to the Governments of the States members of the League that they should begin giving material and

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OUT FILE

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I.  
P.  
G.

F. O.,

October 1947.

57/10

Draft.

Cairo no: 1907  
Jedda no: 416  
Amman no: 451  
Damascus no: 524  
Beirut/Bagdad Telegram no: 876

634

Completed Despatched SP M.

Beirut telegram No. 727 [of 10th October:

Arab League and troop movements] to F. O.

In connexion with reference in Arab

League Council communiqué to military

precautions on the Palestine frontier and

to alarmist press reports of actual troop

movements, please report immediately any

information you may receive regarding troop

movements or the intention of the Government

to which you are accredited on the subject.

Compare Damascus telegram No. 439 [of 11th

October]. of armed forces of

Government to which you are

accredited in connexion

with Palestine situation.

No.

(Date) Oct 14

Repeat to:

3473  
UK Del New York  
H. E. Wash  
10555

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

En-Close

Code

Cypher.

Distribution:—

Cabinet Dist =

Copies to:

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END

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Confidential  
Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO NO. 1907

JEDRA NO. 416

AMMAN NO. 451

DAMASCUS NO. 524

BEIRUT NO. 634

BAGDAD NO. 876

14th October 1947      D. 5. p.m. 15th October 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 3473  
Washington No. 10555

CONFIDENTIAL

Beirut telegram No. 727 [of 10th October: Arab League and troop movements] to Foreign Office.

You will no doubt report immediately any information you may receive regarding movements or plans for movement of armed forces of Government to which you are accredited in connexion with Palestine situation.

ecc

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Reference:-

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